COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS-EDUCATION EMPLOYEES

Los Angeles College Faculty Guild v. Los Angeles Community College District, 2025 Cal App LEXIS 286

The Faculty Guild filed three grievances against the College District under the Educational Employment Relations Act (Gov. Code sections 3540-3549.3). The statute permits educators to enter into collective bargaining agreements with school districts but is narrower than federal law. Under the Act, collective bargaining is limited to “matters relating to wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment.” (Gov. Code § 3543.2(a)(1).) “Terms and conditions of employment” mean health and welfare benefits, leave, transfer and reassignment policies, safety conditions, class size, and procedures for evaluation, discipline, layoff, and grievance.

In one grievance, two employees asserted that the district had failed to complete by the February contract deadline certain construction projects at Los Angeles City College that were undertaken after voters approved construction bonds and that it impaired their ability to safely conduct their classes. The second grievance was filed by employee Williams, who asserted that the district erroneously terminated his instructor position by falsely asserting that the grant of funds that was used for his salary as an instructor had been fully expended. The third grievance was filed by employee Karasik who asserted that the district had miscalculated the points necessary for him to retire. He demanded that the points be recalculated and that he be given back pay.

The district denied all three grievances and the Guild demanded arbitration. The district refused to arbitrate, arguing that none of the grievances’ subject matter was covered by the Act. The Guild filed a petition to compel arbitration, which the trial court denied save for the issue of Karasik’s back pay. The Guild appealed and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The district argued that the first grievance, despite the Guild labeling it as a “safety” issue, was actually about bond funded construction projects outside the scope of representation. The Court agreed. This grievance, while tangentially related to “safety conditions of employment,” ultimately concerned the progress of construction projects the district already agreed to undertake and was in the process of completing with funds pursuant to the Construction Bonds Act. To get funding for new construction, California school districts usually seek voter approval for the issuance of general obligation bonds pursuant to the Construction Bonds Act . Under the Construction Bonds Act, a citizens' oversight committee actively reviews and reports on the proper expenditure of taxpayers' money for school construction. There is no role for the Guild in this process.

The Guild argued that the Williams grievance was arbitrable because it asserted violations of the district's human resources policies. The district countered that the Education Code preempted arbitration of the Williams grievance, and the Guild could not make the grievance arbitrable merely by citing the district's human resources policy. The essence of Williams's grievance was an alleged violation of the Education Code, not the agreement or a district policy. It is not possible to divorce the Guild's allegations of Education Code violations from its allegations of agreement or district policy violations. The Guild alleged in its grievance that either Education Code sections 87470 or 87732 governed Williams's employment. Resolving Williams's grievance would require an arbitrator to interpret the Education Code, which is beyond the scope of the arbitrator's authority under the agreement. Thus, the Education Code preempted this grievance.

The Guild argues the trial court misconstrued the Karasick grievance as seeking a remedy from CalPERS instead of the district and erred in ordering only the backpay part of the grievance to arbitration. The Guild also urged that the agreement allowed the arbitrator to order the injunctive relief it seeks on Karasik's behalf, that the district correct the “service credits” it reports to CalPERS, and that the district permit Karasik and the Guild to review its recalculations before reporting the recalculations to CalPERS. The district asserted the Public Employees' Retirement Law, Gov. Code section 20000 et seq., occupied the field of CalPERS benefits and preempted Karasik's grievance. It pointed out anyone seeking to challenge a CalPERS determination of their benefits must first go through a Public Employees Retirement Law administrative procedure. The Cour tagreed. Karasik's CalPERS benefits were beyond the Guild's scope of representation and his remedy for any service credit correction lay with CalPERS, not the district. The Guild argued the arbitrator could nonetheless order the district to comply with Karasik's request that the district allow him and the Guild to review its recalculations. This proposal was beyond the scope of the arbitrator's powers under the agreement. Article 28 lists only two remedies an arbitrator can order: backpay or a monetary award of up to $2500. There is no mention of injunctive relief. The express language of Article 28 precluded allowance of the relief the Guild sought.